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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Information abounds to support public transit agencies in developing their own cybersecurity
preparedness programs; however, few prescriptions exist. Most available resources are
general in nature or have been adapted from other industries. Effort is required to bring
these general resources into conformity with a particular agency’s needs, given its unique
status and set of circumstances. In the authors’ assessment, there is a reasonable amount
of useful and effective information available to assist transit agencies in implementing a
cybersecurity program: for instance, using the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) cybersecurity framework and implementation guides from the federal government,
the American Public Transportation Association (APTA), and others. However, despite these
resources, far too many agencies have not implemented adequate cybersecurity measures
and are ill prepared to respond to a cyber incident.
For this report, the authors conducted a digital survey to understand each agency’s level of
cybersecurity preparedness, along with dozens of in-person interviews. The most startling
statistic to come from this work is that over 70% of the agencies that responded to the survey
claim they have not yet had many (or any) cybersecurity incidents. Data and research from
other industries suggests that this statistic should be inverted, whereby a large majority of
organizations experience cybersecurity incidents on an increasing and consistent basis. Is
public transit really different from other industries, or are incidents occurring but not being
identified or reported?
The problem may be that cybersecurity is not yet widely seen as a critical issue among
public transit leadership. The incidents that have happened have not spurred the action
one would expect. Both reporting and accountability of them are murky given the current
regulatory environment. There is an exponentially expanding gap between the cybersecurity
preparedness that should exist and the growing exposure to threats from increased reliance
on technology and the opportunity for access by malicious actors.
The report concludes with a series of policy recommendations intended to engage the
Executive Branch, legislative actors and industry to find ways to continue to educate and
direct agency leadership towards the need for action.
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I. INTRODUCTION
San Francisco’s Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) serves a population of 3.3 million people
and has operating expenses that exceed $650 million a year, ranking it as one of the top 15
largest public transit agencies in the U.S.1 Given its size, BART has access to the Department
of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity Advisor’s program (which focuses on the largest U.S.
transit agencies). BART has both the resources and the focus to be more effective than
many other transit agencies at cybersecurity preparedness.
In 2017, a few fresh faces from outside the transit industry were brought aboard to augment
BART’s cybersecurity program. One initiative driven by this new team was a process of due
diligence to verify the pedigree of all newly deployed hardware elements that were part of
its capital projects. The Silicon Valley Berryessa Extension (SVBX) was one of the projects
under review. In March 2018, testing was set to begin for BART to accept the handover of
the contractor’s work on the extension. This contractor is one of the larger, more respected
contractors in the industry. Trust was strong.
The new team asked for the make, model, and serial numbers for the hardware suite that
included over 1,000 devices supplied by Cisco, one of the largest and most prestigious
networking hardware manufacturers in the United States. Cisco takes great care in managing
its supply chain, tracking by serial number when a device is manufactured, when it is put into
service, who owns it over time, and—most importantly—when it is decommissioned. This
supply chain data proved to be invaluable for BART.
Because its size and annual spend, BART enjoys a close relationship with Cisco. Even
with this close relationship, however, the trusted contractor in the middle introduced a
significant issue into BART’s cybersecurity channel. Through this due diligence and working
relationship with Cisco, BART discovered that 86% of the serial numbers on the Cisco
devices turned out to have been decommissioned in hostile nations in years past. Further
research discovered hidden backdoors on the devices, as well as a persistent ‘ping’ where
data are sent to a foreign nation hostile to American interests. In short, BART discovered
intentionally planted spyware.
Fortunately for BART, given its relationship with Cisco, replacements for these 1,000 devices
were shipped within 72 hours, and BART’s team scrambled to install the replacements within
10 days of discovery. However, given the role these devices play in BART’s network, the
vulnerability, had it been exploited, could have been swift and severe. Law enforcement,
including the local Sheriff’s office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the U.S.
Department of Transportation’s (U.S. DOT) Inspector General’s office are still at work
pulling the threads and looking to hold those responsible for this attack accountable. This
investigation is impacting many transit operators in other cities well outside the confines of the
San Francisco Bay Area that did business with the same contractor and subcontractor that
unwittingly purchased counterfeit hardware and have now been swept into an international
criminal investigation.2
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PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION OVERVIEW
Public transportation is deeply woven into American society and is by its very definition
accessible to all. For people who rely on it daily, public transit is critically important. Public
transportation includes urban or rural bus systems, paratransit, bus-rapid transit (BRT),
water-borne services, subways, light rail, streetcars and other urban rail networks, and
passenger rail (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Share of Unlinked Passenger Trips by Mode, 20183
Public transportation is available in every state. In its 2020 Public Transportation Fact
Book, the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) reports that approximately
6,800 organizations provide public transportation through the variety of modes outlined
in Figure 1.4 Of this total, an estimated 4,580 are public nonprofit providers. Systems
operating in urbanized and rural areas that receive grant money from the Federal Transit
Administration’s (FTA) Urbanized Area Formula Program (5,307) or Rural Formula
Program (5,311) are required to report to the National Transit Database (NTD) as full,
reduced, or rural systems. The NTD is the primary source for information and statistics on
transit systems in the United States. Congress requires the NTD to collect financial and
service information annually from public transportation agencies that receive benefits from
FTA grants.5 Of the 2,207 NTD reporting transit systems in 2018, 1,279 were in rural areas
and 928 were in urbanized areas (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Number of NTD Reporting Transit Systems6
Although rural transit providers make up 58% of the NTD reporting systems, they only provide
approximately 1% of the total unlinked trips taken.7 These are important trips, however,
because they are often the only means of transportation for vulnerable populations.
“Importantly, since the early 1970s, public transportation has shown a long-term growth in
ridership, with approximately 37% more unlinked passenger trips taken in 2018.”8 Public
transportation provided 9.95 billion unlinked passenger trips in 2018. Until 2017, the rate of
transit ridership growth exceeded the rate of population growth (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Population vs. Ridership Growth Since 19989
Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Introduction

5

With this growth in transit usage comes a growth in security risks to transit systems—including
risks from cybersecurity vulnerabilities. As more systems and resources are digitized and
connected, more opportunities arise for malicious actors and system malfunctions to disrupt
operations on a massive and potentially catastrophic scale.
APTA, the primary trade association for the public transit industry, made cybersecurity
a priority issue more than a decade ago with the issuance of the APTA Recommended
Practice entitled Securing Control and Communications Systems in Transit Environments,
Part 110 and it has followed that up with subsequent guidance over the years. In an interview
upon becoming the Chair of the APTA Board in 2018, Nathaniel P. Ford, Sr. Chief Executive
Officer of the Jacksonville Transportation Authority, said:
As we expand our use of technologies, such as data-sharing and driverless vehicles,
the threat keeps growing. Public transportation agencies of all sizes and at all locations
are at risk. This is why I have made cybersecurity one of my top priorities.11
In 2019, a Leadership APTA Class focused on cybersecurity and as its capstone project
produced, “Ensuring Cyber Security for Public Transit Agencies in the Age of Autonomy.”12
Also in 2019, APTA produced a training video for transit executives called “Cybersecurity
Fundamentals for Executives.”13
There are two vectors of change affecting transit agencies that exacerbate transit systems’
cybersecurity exposure and will continue to add pressure for more oversight from both federal
and state entities. The first vector of change is data. Transit agencies today are generating
increasingly large volumes of data. For the average agency, however, these data remain
siloed and sparsely integrated with other internal or—more importantly—external systems.
To date, this fragmented architecture has stunted malicious actors’ efforts to access transit
agencies’ data. However, more systems, processes, and applications are coming online
that will enable and require transit agencies to stitch together their data, both within their
organization and in collaboration with other public and private organizations. In the same
interview, Mr. Ford stated:
The risks of operating in this cyber-environment are broad and deep, requiring elevated
levels of awareness and response to potential attacks that can do lasting damage to
hard assets, like infrastructure, and soft ones, like reputation. Increasingly, protecting
these assets is a strategic priority and an operational imperative.14
Data at risk include employee information and operational data, as well as customer and
financial data. As the connected nature of this data patchwork grows, so too will the frequency
with which malicious actors target that data for theft or disruption.
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Hackers Attack Transit System in California’s Capital
In November 2017, Sacramento Regional Transit (SaRT) suffered a ransomware
attack, crippling its website and destroying the underlying data.
What Happened: Hackers gained access to the transit agency’s website and
destroyed all data, taking the website offline. They then requested a ransom of
one bitcoin (worth approximately $8,000 at the time). The agency did not pay the
ransom.
The Response: SaRT was able to restore 80% of the website within days using
backups. The full scope of the breach remained unclear, however, due to limited
practices of logging data.15

In parallel, a second emerging vector of change is the increasingly connected nature of
transit activities. The increased use of sophisticated technology in various aspects of the
transit industry has exacerbated the potential for large-scale disruption to the nation’s transit
activities. Vehicle connectivity is expansive. Numerous technologies are already in the field,
including global positioning systems (GPS), Wi-Fi, cellular, radio, and dedicated short range
communications (DSRC). 5G and other emerging technologies are on the horizon. These
technologies now allow transit agencies to send data back and forth between their vehicles
and the command center, other vehicles, and the internet, in real time.
Tangential to the data patchwork described above, vehicle connectivity is not only making
the data integrated and systemically accessible; it is also making accessible the data from
the operation of the vehicle itself in digital form. The ability for a malicious actor, with the right
access and capabilities, to alter the operation of vehicles—potentially at scale—will become
technically feasible as more vehicles are digitally connected in some fashion, from buses to
trucks to trains and even ferries.
Hackers Hijack a Big Rig Truck’s Accelerator and Brakes
In 2016, researchers were able to successfully hack a 2006 semi-truck and a
2001 school bus and take control over the vehicles’ operations.
What Happened: Researchers “managed to speed up the truck against the
driver’s will… and they found that, at least when the bus was in neutral with the
parking brake on, their engine-revving hack worked on the school bus, too.”
The Response: “It is imperative that the trucking industry begins to take software
security more seriously,” the Michigan researchers conclude in their paper
describing their work.16
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Add to these trends the already painful examples of ransomware and other active attacks
occurring with alarming frequency. It is well past time for transit agencies to seriously invest
in cybersecurity, from adequate resourcing and implementing best practices for threat
mitigation to developing robust systems and plans to recover as incidents arise. Current
guidance and support for transit agencies exists, but it requires that transit agencies invest
and ensure agency-wide understanding and compliance. Regulations are sparse, but, in
many cases, best practices do exist, and change is underway. Transit agencies that move
forward now will not only be safer from disruption from cybersecurity threats: they will also
be better positioned to meet and influence federal, state, and other regulatory actions
undoubtedly on the horizon.

REPORT ORGANIZATION
Section I of the report provides an introduction to the transit industry and the growing risks that
cybersecurity presents. Section II provides a summary of the methods used to research the
subject matter and compile this report. In Section III, the authors discuss transit operations’
cyber vulnerabilities and risks. Section IV provides a review of the guidance available to
transit agencies. Section V explores the findings from this study. Section VI provides policy
recommendations to better support cybersecurity readiness among public transit agencies.
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II. METHODOLOGY
This study employed a multi-method approach to research and evaluate the status of public
transit agencies’ cyber preparedness and to develop policy recommendations to enhance
those levels of preparedness. The study focused on public surface transit agencies that
receive funding from the FTA and operate in the United States. Private agencies and agencies
that serve other countries were considered out of the study’s scope. Only agencies that
provide surface transit were considered; all other modes were excluded.
1. Literature Review. The authors reviewed literature on physical and digital
cybersecurity strategies in transit as well as other industries and applied key findings
from this review to develop oral and digital surveys and policy recommendations.
The authors supplemented the literature review with an internet search of recent
cyber incidents and innovative and emerging trends in cybersecurity. Many of the
online resources filled gaps in the literature where existing publications had not kept
pace with cybersecurity practices and innovations. Finally, the authors attended
relevant sessions at the 2019 APTATech Technology Conference, the 2019 APTA
Annual Conference, the 2019 ITS World Congress, and the 2020 Transportation
Research Board Meeting.
2. Expert Interviews. Between winter 2019 and spring 2020, the authors developed
an interview protocol and conducted three groupings of expert interviews. In the
interview process, the authors were careful to walk through all of the scripted
questions with each interview subject, but the discussion was otherwise unstructured,
which enabled the authors to explore specific experiences and anecdotes that the
interview subjects were able to contribute on the topics at hand. The first group,
interviews with transit operators, was led by Scott Belcher and Brandon Thomas,
and it entailed anonymous interviews with 26 transit chief executives or chief security
officers (whose titles differed by organization and ranged from Chief Information
Security Officer to Chief Technology Officer to IT professional). These interviews
gathered data from 20 public transit operations and were representative of the
size, geographic scope, and diverse nature of the nation’s public transit operators.
The second group, interviews with transit professionals not currently employed by
transit operators, was led by Scott Belcher, Brandon Thomas, Eric Greenwald, and
Ed Merlis.17 The third group, interviews with government officials, was led by Eric
Greenwald, Scott Belcher, and Ed Merlis. These interviews included representatives
of the U.S. DOT, the FTA, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS, in
particular the DHS’ Cybersecurity Infrastructure and Security Agency, CISA), the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP), and professional staff from both the United States
House of Representatives and the United States Senate. Twenty-two professionals
were interviewed, a number of interviews that the authors requested with Hill staff
could not be completed given the nature of the study and availability of key staffers
during the uncharacteristically busy period in which the interviews were conducted.
Copies of the interview questions are attached as appendices.
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3. Digital Survey. Based on the information gathered in the literature review and the
oral interviews, the authors developed a digital survey that was sent to U.S.-based
public transit operator executives during the winter of 2020. Survey responses were
matched with data from the NTD. APTA provided the authors a list of 327 executives
(APTA members who lead public transit agencies registered in the NTD), of which
312 were unique. Of these 312 executives, 287 were U.S.-based operators.18 APTA
members represent the vast majority of the U.S. industry in terms of populations
served, unlinked passenger trips, and passenger miles. APTA reports that more
than 90% of the American and Canadian population using public transportation use
services provided by APTA members.19
From the 312 surveys issued, the authors received 104 total responses and culled those
to 90 by eliminating incomplete responses, responses that could not be definitively
correlated with a specific transit agency in the NTD, duplicate responses, and
responses from non-U.S. operators, yielding an overall survey response rate of 31%.
Altogether, the agencies that responded to the survey serve over 124 million
people—roughly a third of the entire population of the United States. Of the 90
agencies, only five (6% of respondents) are considered rural, having lower
populations than the general population and being less subject to emerging trends
in mobility.20 Rural agencies are subject to fewer FTA reporting requirements.
Nearly 60% of public transit agencies in the NTD are rural, but they comprise just
over one percent of the transit trips in the United States.21 The authors recognize
that rural agencies are underrepresented in the survey data collected; the 85
other agencies that responded to the survey serve populations of 50,000 or more.
A more detailed review of the populations that survey respondents serve shows a
fairly broad distribution (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Population Served by Survey Respondents22
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The survey netted a similarly broad distribution with respect to the organizational
size of the responding entities. Agencies ranged in size from $100K to $1B+ in
operating expenses (Figure 5). Of the agencies surveyed, 17% were small (<$10M
in operating expenses) and 33% were extra-large (>$100M in operating expenses).23
Where the data identifies differences between the size of the agency that appear
to be based solely on size or on the rural nature of the of transit agency, these
differences are called out for the reader.

Figure 5. Agency Size of Survey Respondents24
4. Policy Recommendations. The authors identified three focus areas for
recommendations: the Executive Branch, the Legislature, and Industry/Association.
5. Limitations of Study. The intent of this study is to assess the readiness, resources,
and structure of public transit agencies to identify, protect from, detect, respond to,
and recover from cybersecurity vulnerabilities and threats.25 The authors excluded
private entities involved in transit (e.g., auto manufacturers; private bus and rail
companies; mobility on demand (MOD) companies that include car, bike, scooter,
and share companies).
Further, while the authors conducted an assessment of the threats
currently facing the transit industry, they did not closely examine emerging
technologies that will soon be widely used in transit, such as connected
vehicles (i.e., vehicles that communicate with each other to prevent crashes)
or autonomous vehicles. In this report, the authors focused on identifying
general measures to improve cybersecurity for transit agencies in a manner
that is agnostic to the specific technologies that those agencies employ.
The authors did not assess the internal cybersecurity capabilities of public or
private organizations with whom many agencies integrate and/or share data, such
as major industry vendors, trade associations, and/or federal agencies such as
U.S. DOT or DHS.
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Finally, this report was written as the COVID-19 pandemic spread across the globe.
The authors made no attempt to predict what the transit industry would look like
after COVID-19; however, the principles set forth in this report will be as relevant, if
not more relevant, in a post-pandemic environment.
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III. TRANSIT CYBERSECURITY RISK PROFILE
Like every facet of society, public transit has been going through multiple waves of
technological evolution. Every aspect of transit operations is subject to change, whether
it is routing, scheduling, or payment. Payment has moved from fare boxes, in which riders
inserted cash or coins, to payment by smartphone and digital wallet. Routing changes that
were once done manually were so time- and labor-intensive that they rarely occurred; now,
they can be done with modern mapping technology, artificial intelligence, and machine
learning, as well as better software. Transit operators can now run real-time route scenarios
to optimize their services. Knowing when and where to catch the next bus used to require a
series of paper printouts and signs. Today, riders can not only obtain this information on their
smartphones, but it will also be updated in real time.
The modern transit operator collects and maintains an ever-increasing volume of data
concerning its operating systems, vehicles, employees, and customers. Buses transmit
operator communications, bus operations data, and in some cases, live video and rider
internet activity. This data “exhaust,” as many in the technology world refer to it, has made
public transit more convenient, safer, and more efficient. Automatic passenger counters,
centrally aided dispatch, automatic vehicle location software, and real-time bus arrival
systems have improved transit operations. Similarly, technologies such as traffic signal
preemption, dynamic rerouting, and lane departure warning systems have also increased
buses’ and transit systems’ safety and efficiency (Figure 6).

Figure 6. Percentage of Buses with Passenger Equipment, 2009–201926
Transit systems have also become increasingly complex, owing to an ever-increasing
use of transportation network companies (TNCs), first- and last-mile MOD services,
and mobility-as-a-service (MaaS) options. Public transportation agencies are becoming
“mobility hubs,” where riders are able to manage their use of public transit as well as MOD
services that are often provided by private companies such as shared-use cars, scooters,
bikes, or skateboards, taxis, or autonomous shuttles.
This changing transportation environment is forcing transit agencies to rethink their
business strategies as well as their offerings. Are they bus or subway companies, or mobility
providers? If they are mobility providers, how do they compete with massive Silicon Valley
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companies like Alphabet or Uber, or with nimble start-ups like Via or Moovit?
COVID-19 has only exacerbated the need for transit agencies to adapt and change. To
succeed, however, these agencies need not “do it all.” There is no shame in outsourcing
aspects of their offerings, if that is the most efficient means to deliver services. Transit
agencies need to focus on what they do well, contract out what they don’t, and leverage
technology and data, lest they be left behind. Meeting rider demand requires adopting new
technologies and services that transit operators are only beginning to understand, much
less fully integrate into their security operations.

TRENDS IN TRANSIT
Public transit agencies are contracting out aspects of their system with increasing
regularity. Most agencies have historically contracted with a limited number of companies
that dominated the market with proprietary hardware and software. One Chief Innovation
Officer shared that her organization, like many others, had “two key vendors that provide the
majority of our software and hardware, but as we modernize, we are looking to implement
a more modular infrastructure.”27
This is the way it has been, but it is not the way it will remain. In a world of on-demand
travel, TNCs, artificial intelligence, multimodal trip planners, and so on, incumbent vendors
are under direct threat from start-ups and new entrants adept at integrating with application
program interfaces (APIs). The age of the one-stop shop for an agency’s technology needs
is waning. Many incumbent vendors will not survive, but neither will the average public
transit agency if it does not get smart about the changing nature of the market and, by
extension, the increasing risks of cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
Each time a new technology, a new connection, a new data source, or a new vendor is
added to a transit agency’s network, so too is a new range of cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
Ironically, the public transit agencies that have been slowest to modernize their fleets and
their operations are the least likely to become cybersecurity targets, as they have fewer
access points. However, they are also the ones least likely to survive this technological
revolution, as they are less equipped to understand and adapt to shifts in ridership behavior
and the changing needs of their community.
Companies like Uber and Lyft have cherry-picked riders with lesser or no subsidies away
from traditional fixed-route services, creating direct competition with public transit agencies
for ridership. To address this new competition, many public transit agencies have partnered
with these same companies to provide new or expanded service offerings: an alliance of
enemies of sorts. MOD has become a battleground for public transit agencies. Historically,
transit agencies have provided limited first-/last-mile services, paratransit supplements,
or micro-transit services. APTA’s 2019 Fare Database recorded 36 transit agencies with
mobility pilots, either with Uber, Lyft, other private operators, or in-house operators.28 Some
agencies are now evolving into mobility hubs for an entire region.
Many private companies such as Genfare, Bytemark, and Transit serve as vendors for
MOD services to transit agencies, while some public transit agencies offer their own
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version (e.g., DART). Each has its own platform for data management, privacy, and risk.
As transit agencies have struggled with this new paradigm, so too have private vendors.
Some have failed, such as Chariot and Moovel, while others have consolidated or have
been purchased: Intel bought Moovit, Trapeze entered into a strategic partnership with
Masabi, Uber transferred its electric bike/scooter company Jump to Lime and led a $170M
investment round in Lime, while both were taking significant losses and laying off staff.29
The key take-away from this changing mobility landscape is that it will continue to be
unstable and that the transit experience will be based on new forms of connectivity, which
leads to new forms of vulnerability.

RISK IN TRANSIT
As noted above, failing to modernize could result in the public transit agency becoming
irrelevant, but modernizing carries with it the risk of exposing riders and the general public to
a different, growing array of threats. Those transit agencies that have learned to adopt new
technologies to improve efficiency in operations have not necessarily adopted technology to
minimize vulnerability to cybersecurity threats at the same rate.30
While the survey results do not provide detailed information on the adoption of effective
cybersecurity measures, some of the data do reveal a prevalent underappreciation of the
scale and nature of the threat. Most of the agencies that responded to the survey claimed they
had not yet had many (or any) cybersecurity incidents. Of the 90 agencies that responded
to the survey, only 20 (22%) admitted to having experienced a cybersecurity incident where
more than 1,000 records were breached, over $10K in losses were incurred, or an operating
system was down for more than one hour (Figure 7).31 This reporting seems highly suspect,
as will be discussed in the findings section.

Figure 7.

Have You Had an Incident?

By comparison, Dell Technologies surveyed over 1,000 IT professionals from public and
private organizations with over 250 employees across various industries and found that 82%
had suffered a disruptive event (defined as downtime or data loss). Though this comparison
is not direct, given the ambiguity in the thresholds assumed in the Dell survey, Section V
discusses in more detail reasons to suggest most public transit agencies are unaware of
cyber intrusion activity that may be happening among their systems.
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Figure 8. Percentage of Global Organizations That Suffered From a Disruptive
Event32

Threat Vectors
In general, the transportation sector faces the same spectrum of cyber threats as most
industries that rely heavily on technology. What distinguishes transit agencies from other
potential targets of cyber-attack is the nature and severity of potential consequences that could
result from cyber-attacks to transit operators. These range from routine website outages and
theft (similar to what that many companies face) to nightmare scenarios involving substantial
loss of life and massive property damage that could result from malicious actors remotely
targeting transit systems.

Phishing and Business Email Compromise
Phishing is the fraudulent attempt to obtain sensitive information such as usernames,
passwords, and credit card details by disguising oneself as a trustworthy entity in an
electronic communication. In the most common vector for phishing attacks, the malicious
actor induces the recipient to click on a link that sends the recipient to a website that either
directly drops malicious code on the recipient’s computer or tricks the recipient into revealing
account credentials (username and password), enabling the attacker to then impersonate
the recipient and gain access to that account.
In a 2018 study, F5 Labs found that “phishing continues to be a top attack vector and, in
many cases, is the tried-and-true, go-to attack vector in multi-vector attacks.”33 Phishing is
particularly important because it provides the attacker access to important accounts and can
be the entry point to other types of cyber-attacks. Transit operators can be attractive phishing
targets because of their large and often dispersed workforce—and the potential for a lucrative
return given the value of such data. One of the 2019 Leadership APTA Class capstone
projects focused on cybersecurity and found that phishing is by far the most common type
of cyber-attack.34
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Business Email Compromise (BEC) is a more targeted and sophisticated form of phishing, in
which the malicious actor impersonates a CEO or other high-level official within a company,
usually with the intent of tricking the recipient into transferring money to a bank account
controlled by the malicious actor. In 2018, the FBI reported that thieves used BEC scams to
collect more than $12 billion between 2013 and 2018.35
With respect to BEC attacks, transit agencies face the same sort of risks from these threat
vectors as most companies; however, while these attacks are typically used by criminals
simply seeking financial gain, their low risk, low cost, and generally high probability of
success means that they also serve as the initial point of entry for malicious actors seeking
to do even more damage.

Data Breaches
Data breaches have become a bigger part of the general consciousness as more and larger
breaches by more prominent organizations have been discovered in recent years. The type
of breach most often to hit the news is one that affects customers, because it results in the
loss of the customers’ personally identifiable information (PII). Typically, the primary impact
on companies suffering a data breach is the cost associated with (1) technical remediation of
the breach, (2) notification to the victims, and (3) provision of defense against the numerous
lawsuits (e.g., from customers, shareholders, and state attorneys general). In a 2019 report,
IBM and the Ponemon Institute released a report finding that data breaches increased by
130% from 2006 to 2019. The report estimated the average cost of a breach in the United
States at $8.19 million.36
It’s worth highlighting that victim notification requirements are driven by state law, which can
vary significantly from one jurisdiction to the next.37 This effectively amounts to an additional
(and complex) set of compliance requirements completely separate from the transit-sector
specific regulations that arise at the federal level. Not only is compliance with this patchwork
set of laws proving to be increasingly costly, but failure to do so carries an increasing risk of
investigation from state prosecutors.
There have been a number of recent high-profile incidents causing regulators to take a
more active role in investigating data breaches. There have been increases in the number of
inquiries, the speed with which they are made and the number of jurisdictions in which they
are brought. 38
While malicious actors targeting customer data can monetize that data in a variety of
ways, the most plentiful source is typically customer payment information. For many transit
agencies, customer payment information is rather limited because most agencies outsource
their payment processing. Most payment transactions are governed by Payment Card
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), a set of compliance requirements established
by the PCI Security Standards Council. This industry standard was designed to reduce
the risk and cost of credit card fraud. It is precisely because this standard imposes fairly
stringent security requirements that the vast majority of transit agencies have outsourced
their payment processing.
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PCI Security
The PCI Security Standards Council touches the lives of hundreds of millions
of people worldwide. A global organization, it maintains, evolves, and promotes
Payment Card Industry standards for the safety of cardholder data across the
globe.
The Council serves those who work with and are associated with payment
cards. This includes: merchants of all sizes, financial institutions, point-of-sale
vendors, and hardware and software developers who create and operate the
global infrastructure for processing payments.
The Council has two priorities:
1. Helping merchants and financial institutions understand and implement
standards for security policies, technologies, and ongoing processes that
protect their payment systems from breaches and theft of cardholder data.
2. Helping vendors understand and implement standards for creating secure
payment solutions.39
Figure 9 shows that among public transit agencies surveyed, 84% do not manage customer
payment information. This places the onus of data security less on the agency and more
on the vendor, and those vendors are generally subject to strict security standards under
PCI DSS.

Figure 9. Do You Process and/or Store Customer Payment Information Directly?
Although most transit agencies outsource their payment activities, all transit agencies have
little choice but to retain sensitive data on their own employees. Employee data often include
social security numbers, dates of birth, and other critical identifying information. This type
of data, while usually found in smaller volumes than troves of payment data, is often more
valuable to criminals, as there is a robust market for the kind of sensitive information found
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in employee records. At many agencies, the tools used to manage this data are rudimentary.
Sharing is conducted using spreadsheets, email, and other unsecure channels.

Compromise of Operational Networks
While transit agencies are justified in focusing on loss of customer and employee data, the
compromise of operational data, such as running industrial control systems, traffic signals,
and emergency communications networks, brings with it the potential for far more destructive
consequences. Experts believe that there is not enough focus on operational technology
and business interruption concerns.40
Among public transit agencies, there is a growing understanding of the value of operational
data, particularly as data are leveraged to improve service. However, driving advances in
efficiency without corresponding improvements in security will leave agencies exposed and
at risk. Adam Cottini, managing director of the cyber liability practice with Gallagher, a global
leader in insurance and risk management, stated that “the critical processes themselves
could be vulnerable to attacks which could lead to business interruption, cyber ransomware,
and potentially data protection.”41 Beyond a serious interruption in operations, transit agencies
may be targeted for destructive and potentially deadly cyber-attacks.
Unlike many industries, where the potential consequences of poor cybersecurity are
largely financial or privacy-driven, an attack on a public transit system has the potential
to be lethal. Vulnerable supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems could
be hijacked by terrorists or cyber-criminals to cause derailments or collisions. While this
nightmare scenario has not yet occurred, there have been numerous incidents involving
mass transit and other SCADA-dependent industries that paint a clear picture of how it
could happen.42
Good operational security would dictate isolating these networks from the internet and
only allowing access from within a transit agency’s physical facilities. However, poor
understanding of security practices and the compelling desire for efficiency that comes
with remote access and operation frequently overrides what should be an imperative to
protect these critical systems.

Ransomware
Ransomware attacks, particularly among city agencies, have increased in recent years. In
such situations, the attacker seeks to take control of the organization’s systems or data.
Control can be taken in the form of resetting administrator passwords or encrypting key
databases. The attacker then asks for payment to return control back to the organization.
Ransomware is software that infects computer systems. Attackers infiltrate the system often
through a single device and the program spreads from one device to another. As the infection
promulgates, data is corrupted beyond use. Often as part of the spread, the attacker provides
an “extortion message” declaring its demands for restoring the system.
The demand often includes a series of deadlines for payment: each missed deadline
leads to a higher ransom demand and perhaps some destroyed files. If the victim
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fails to pay, the attacker discards the decryption keys, making the data permanently
inaccessible.43
For transit agencies, ransomware presents an outsized risk. If malicious actors are able
to lock up critical data, the suspension of all operational activity could result. The strategy
promoted by law enforcement has long been to discourage paying ransom demands. As
a result, organizations are left to restore access on their own or to rely on data archives or
other resources to restore systems. This is feasible for some, but certainly not for all transit
agencies—especially those agencies that have not planned for such a scenario.
Table 1.

Ransomware Growth in the U.S.44

According to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center, the number of victims reporting ransomware attacks has declined in recent years, though there was an increase
in 2019. However, the amount demanded—and paid—is on the rise, with the average
ransom in 2019 growing more than sixfold from 2015. Attackers are more selective
and tend to go after larger companies that will likely pay but do not have the IT staff to
handle a recovery. The losses do not include business losses (such as wages, files,
third-party remediation). The FBI said not all victims reported the actual loss, so the
amounts could be low.
Date

Victims

Victim Losses

Average Loss per Victim

2019

2,047

$8,965,847

$4,380

2018

1,493

$3,621,857

$2,426

2017

1,783

$2,344,365

$1,315

2016

2,673

$2,431,261

$910

2015

2,453

$1,620,814

$661

Source: The Colorado Sun

Debbi Blyth, the Chief Information Security Officer for the State of Colorado, relayed the
story of how the Colorado Department of Transportation‘s (CDOT) network was taken down,
brought back, and then taken down again by malware known as SamSam: “the impact was
fast and furious… server administrators, database administrators, backup administrators
and hundreds of calls to the help desk—and that was all in the hour or first couple hours of
opening for business.”45
In at least one sense, CDOT was fortunate, as the attack only impacted their business
networks with a total recovery cost of $1.7 million. The authors do not have data with which
to estimate the probable cost to a transit agency of operations disrupted by ransomware,
but the transportation logistics industry does. Shipping giant Maersk suffered approximately
$200 million in losses as a result of the NotPetya ransomware,46 and the Australian company
TollGroup is still tallying up the costs from its second ransomware attack in three months.
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Vendor Management
Effective cybersecurity management does not end at the edge of an organization’s systems:
successful strategies and plans must also include vendors that support operations. Any
weakness in a vendor is a weakness for all the organizations it supports.
Vendors are a common attack vector for malicious actors, as those companies often have
trusted relationships with their customers. The exploitation of this trust relationship can be as
simple as luring an employee to click on a link in an email that appears to be coming from the
vendor, or it can be as complex as compromising a direct connection between the vendor’s
network and that of the transit agency.47

Target Hacked
In the 2013 retail giant Target was compromised by hackers that stole credentials
from a third-party vendor that provided refrigeration, heating, and air conditioning
services to Target. The vendor was provided direct access to the Target computer
networks (possibly for the purpose of monitoring energy consumption at Target
facilities). The attackers were able to compromise Target’s payment system
network through the third-party vendor’s network access.
Effective cybersecurity management among vendors begins with contracts. Standard
clauses are included in contracts that center on cybersecurity audit requirements, monitoring
requirements, and notification requirements. Audit requirements typically ensure a third party
is engaged periodically to confirm compliance. For some, certain requirements are made
clarifying who can provide such audit services, such as firms with U.S. ownership or certain
accreditations. Most stipulate how often an external audit must be conducted, as well as
the documentation that must be shared with the client. Monitoring requirements can include
specifications regarding what data are tracked and how long they are stored. Notification
requirements define what situations warrant notification to the customer or client, and in what
time frame.
For reference, 41% of public transit agencies surveyed said they do not currently have
standard clauses related to cybersecurity currently included in their vendor contracts. An
additional 21% responded that they did not know whether they included such clauses in their
vendor contracts (see Figure 10). These numbers are inherently troubling, but they also raise
questions as to the sophistication of the standard clauses that transit agencies have inserted
in their vendor contracts—and the extent to which the requirements in those clauses are
monitored, enforced, or even understood by those who include the clauses in the contract.
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Figure 10. Do You Have Standard Clauses in Your Vendor Contracts Related to
Cybersecurity?
These clauses are designed to require that vendors implement basic cybersecurity measures
to reduce the likelihood that malicious actors are able to exploit the vendor’s systems and
then leverage that exploit to attack the transit agency.
Beyond contract clauses establishing cybersecurity requirements, vendor management
related to cybersecurity can be very valuable for ensuring the necessary measures are in place
to reduce exposure and mitigate impacts as incidents occur. Physically reviewing operations
and asking questions about access and system credentials can help convey to the vendor
the seriousness of cybersecurity. Cybersecurity requirements established through vendor
contracts can provide a solid basis on which to manage vendors’ cybersecurity practices.
This can be an especially valuable tool for those operators that have resource constraints.

Counterfeit Hardware
It is easy to assume that the BART counterfeit hardware example provided in the introduction
to this report is an anomaly or a one-off. Unfortunately, it is anything but. That incident alone
led to the discovery of counterfeit hardware in a number of U.S. transit operations, all from
the same contractor. In 2012, the Senate Committee on Armed Services issued a sobering
report on the volume of counterfeit electronics being sold to the various departments of
the armed services and the major U.S. companies that serve them such as BAE, Boeing,
Lockheed, and Honeywell.48
The Committee’s investigation uncovered overwhelming evidence of large numbers of
counterfeit parts making their way into critical defense systems. It revealed failures by
defense contractors and the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to report counterfeit
parts, as well as gaps in DOD’s knowledge of the scope and impact of such parts on
defense systems.49
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Despite the serious conclusions from this eight-year-old Senate report, malicious actors
continue to use hardware as a means of accessing cyber networks. In 2017, DHS seized
more than 34,000 shipments of counterfeit and pirated products. Approximately 12% of
the shipments seized were health-, safety-, and security-related products.50 With budget
constraints and limited tools accessible, transit agencies remain vulnerable on this front.

Supply Chain Risk Management
On May 15, 2019, the White House issued Executive Order (EO) 13873, Securing the
Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, which will have
cascading effects for transportation as well as other sectors.51 The EO covers broad-based
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and supply chain risk, encompassing 5G
network gear, and it is much more than a ban on Huawei.
Huawei is a Chinese multinational information technology and consumer electronics company
that has been accused by the United States and other nations of corporate espionage and
intellectual property theft. In 2019, Huawei was restricted from engaging in commerce with
U.S. companies resulting from allegations that it willfully exported technology of U.S. origin
to Iran in violation of U.S. sanctions. The May 15, 2019 EO bans any entity that is “owned
by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary” from doing
business in the U.S. and will impact every mode of transportation, including aviation, transit,
rail, maritime, trucking, autonomous vehicles, and drones, among others.
In December 2019, Donald Trump signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act for
2020, which included a provision banning the use of federal funds to purchase “rolling stock”
(e.g., cars, vans, buses, rail cars) made by companies “owned or controlled” by countries
that the U.S. Trade Representative has identified on its Priority Watch List.52 The ban is
to take effect on December 20, 2021. While the Executive Branch is still in the process of
finalizing this list, the most relevant country to be subject to these restrictions is China whose
electric bus manufacturer BYD has manufactured over 400 buses in Lancaster, PA, and has
the most electric buses in operation in the United States.
These efforts reflect a growing concern over cyber supply chain risk management in the
transit sector. Other sectors have been gradually waking up to the realization that the
technological equipment they purchase may suffer from pervasive vulnerabilities before it
is even connected to their business or operational networks. Whether due to insufficient
security in the engineering of the hardware, software, or firmware; compromise of the
industrial process by nation-state actors; or active collaboration between the manufacturer
and these actors, the reality is that, owing to the highly distributed, global manufacturing
process, virtually no supply chain can be guaranteed secure.
As with other areas of risk, public transit agencies have been slow to respond to this
threat. Of the transit agencies that participated in the oral interviews Washington, D.C.’s
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) described their active and robust supply chain
risk management program. Such a sophisticated program is beyond the resources of all but
the largest transit agencies, but each transit agency is exposed to the risk.
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WMATA’s Supply Chain Cybersecurity Program
WMATA began putting in place a robust Supply Chain Cybersecurity Program over
the past year. While still in its developmental phases, it has matured substantially
over the last six months. Its progress has been expedited by Congressional
interest in Chinese manufacturing.
WMATA’s approach is to start with the premise that all procured information and
operation technology is inherently at risk, regardless of where it is manufactured.
The WMATA program starts by including a cybersecurity professional as an
approver in all procurements involving technology. This can be a challenge, as
technology is often baked into complex solicitations, like building a new rail station,
which can slip through the cracks if the project manager or contracting officer does
not realize what “technology” is exactly. Closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras,
elevators or escalators, and information displays are examples of elements of a
procurement that are tied to information technology but can easily be overlooked.
Once the cybersecurity team gets a procurement, they then look to apply standard
language around things like protecting data (e.g., encryption standards), locking
down open ports or permissions (e.g., access control), not using default passwords,
and so on. WMATA has built a guide of standard language that the supply chain
team can cut and paste from, ensuring a consistent application of standards. This
standardization helps measure cost implications across procurements and helps
steer vendors towards reasonable solutions, as often WMATA’s requirements are
the first they have encountered and can seem unreasonable at first blush. This
process requires risk analysis and customization. The requirements exist on a
scale of stringency based on the types of systems involved or data processed
(e.g., does the new technology support train control versus elevator control, does
the system process PCI data).
Of course, a portion of the team’s time in this first year has been spent on educating
WMATA’s own workforce. For many employees who have been buying this
standard technology for years (or decades) without cybersecurity involvement,
the added time and cost can be unexpected. Once the language is accepted
by the organization, the team will need to dedicate time to evaluating vendor
responses to these new issues. This phase cannot be overlooked and can be
very time-consuming. However, WMATA has concluded that if they don’t measure
the effectiveness of the solutions offered, there is very little point in instituting the
requirements in the first place.53

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

23

24

IV. EXISTING CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE FOR TRANSIT
The existing cybersecurity guidance for public transit is spread across numerous government
and industry entities. This section gives a broad overview of the guidance available to the
transit industry and highlights the major documents provided by both the regulatory bodies
as well as non-profit trade associations. This overview is meant to direct researchers and
individual transit agencies towards the most meaningful documents that can guide them in
developing their own cybersecurity plans.
Given this complexity, there is limited accountability for cybersecurity programs among
public transit agencies. Despite this limited accountability, federal resources exist for
agencies to improve their cybersecurity readiness. Executive Order 13800, Strengthening
the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure, makes federal agencies
accountable for managing cybersecurity risks to their ecosystem, and it further encourages
them to work with all entities to adopt the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Cybersecurity Framework.54 Federal agencies directly involved in supporting Transportation
System Sector (TSS) cybersecurity preparedness include NIST, DHS, and the U.S. DOT.
With the rise of the internet, digital, and connected systems, DHS, among other agencies,
has developed an array of both offensive and defensive tools and tactics to protect against
cyber threats. The bulk of this work is focused on what is deemed to be critical infrastructure.
There are 16 critical infrastructure sectors whose assets, systems, and networks,
whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that their
incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national
economic security, or national public health or safety.55
The TSS is the sector on that list in which public transit agencies sit. Given this label,
DHS and other federal agencies are not only accountable, but they are also mandated to
support the security of America’s transit systems, both their physical and digital components.
Moreover, as noted above, the risk profile of these systems is increasing as technology
evolves. However, to date, the regulatory regime is behind in establishing the necessary
regulation, compliance requirements, and oversight to ensure the nation’s transit systems
adequately address current and future cybersecurity threats. The existing regulatory and
oversight gap is increasing as the role of technology expands in the functioning and efficiency
of how transit systems operate.
On February 12, 2013, the White House released Presidential Policy Directive 21 outlining
the federal government’s responsibility to strengthen the security and resilience of U.S.
critical infrastructure against both physical and cyber threats.56 The Directive established that
DHS and U.S. DOT share responsibility for the TSS. In sharing this role, the DHS’s and U.S.
DOT’s responsibilities include:
• Collaborating with critical infrastructure owners and operators
• Coordinating with state, local, tribal, and territorial entities to implement the directive
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• Providing, supporting, or facilitating technical assistance and consultations to identify
vulnerabilities and help mitigate incidents in the sector

THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY (NIST)
The foundation for much of the United States’ cybersecurity efforts, including DHS and
U.S. DOT, is the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. NIST is a non-regulatory agency: it
has no authority to dictate the use of any particular standard. However, when there is a
matter of public good that depends on establishing a standard, NIST convenes relevant
public and private stakeholders to develop the standard, as they have done in the face of
cybersecurity threats.
In February 2014, NIST released the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure
Security in response to Presidential Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity,57 which called for a standardized security framework for critical infrastructure
in the United States. It is not a how-to guide for cybersecurity; rather, it is a framework
designed to help a wide range of organizations assess risk and make sound decisions
about prioritizing and allocating resources to reduce the risk of compromise or failure in
their computer networks. For any organization to leverage the NIST Framework, customized
implementation is required in ways that are not necessarily obvious from the document.
NIST Cybersecurity Framework: Key Functions
Identify: develop the organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk
to systems, assets, data, and capabilities;
Protect: develop and implement the appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of
critical infrastructure services;
Detect: develop and implement the appropriate activities to identify the occurrence
of a cybersecurity event;
Respond: develop and implement the appropriate activities to take action
regarding a detected cybersecurity event;
Recover: develop and implement the appropriate activities to maintain plans for
resilience and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to a
cybersecurity event.58

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Within DHS, there are two key entities responsible for addressing the cybersecurity needs
of the TSS: the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) and the Transportation
Security Agency (TSA).
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. CISA was formed in November
2018 with the purpose of building national capacity to defend against cyber-attacks. In
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addition to its mission to improve protections for federal government computer systems,
CISA also develops “trusted partnerships across the public and private sectors” to deliver
“technical assistance and assessments.”59
Transportation Security Administration. TSA’s origins date back to the days after
September 11, 2001, when it was formed as part of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act. Its “mission is to protect the nation’s transportation systems to ensure
freedom of movement for people and commerce.”60 Given its provenance, TSA’s original
orientation centered on physical security, but the agency “is responsible for securing the
nation’s transportation systems from all threats, including both physical and cyber.”61
In this latter role, TSA overlaps with CISA. TSA explains the division of labor as follows:
Although TSA has responsibility for oversight of both the physical security and
cybersecurity of the [TSS], TSA is not directly responsible for the defense of the private
sector portion of TSS information technology infrastructure. Rather, TSA serves a vital
role in ensuring the cybersecurity resilience of the TSS infrastructure and will work with
the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), with its mission to protect
the critical infrastructure of the United States.62
In 2015, DHS built upon the NIST Framework and issued a document “to provide the TSS
guidance, resource direction, and a directory of options to assist a TSS organization,
[including public transit agencies], in adopting an industry-compatible version of the
NIST Framework.”63 This guidance was designed both for transit agencies that have
an existing risk-management program and for agencies that do not yet have a formal
cybersecurity program.64

TSS Cybersecurity Framework Implementation Guidance
The TSS Cybersecurity Framework Implementation Guidance and its companion
workbook provide an approach for Transportation Systems Sector65 owners and
operators to apply the tenets of the National Institute of Standards and Technology
Cybersecurity Framework66 to help reduce cyber risks. Specifically, organizations
may use the implementation guidance to:
• Characterize their current cybersecurity posture
• Identify opportunities for enhancing existing cyber risk management programs
• Find existing tools, standards, and guides to support Framework implementation
• Communicate their risk management issues to internal and external stakeholders
Further, organizations that lack a formal cybersecurity risk management program
could use the guidance to establish risk-based cyber priorities.67
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While this kind of guidance is potentially of great utility to transit agencies, it does not address
the significant resource constraints that most transit agencies face, and it provides neither
incentive to encourage improvements in cybersecurity nor accountability for failure to do so.

DHS Programs for Public Transit Agencies
Working together, CISA and TSA have established a number of different mechanisms to
provide outreach and support to transit agencies. One key program is the Cybersecurity
Advisors (CSAs) Program. CSAs are DHS personnel assigned to ten regions throughout
the United States, corresponding to the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA)
geographic regions. They are responsible for cultivating partnerships with TSS entities—in
this case, the largest transit agencies—and providing direct assistance to those entities to
promote cybersecurity preparedness, risk mitigation, and incident response capabilities.68
CSA SERVICES
Cybersecurity Advisors offer six types of services:
1. Cyber Preparedness: On-site meetings to promote best practices
2. Strategic Messaging: Briefings, keynotes, and panel discussions to help
improve cybersecurity awareness and cybersecurity posture
3. Working Group Support: Assisting stakeholders in existing information
sharing cybersecurity initiatives
4. Partnership Development: Building local and regional cybersecurity
private–public partnerships
5. Cyber Assessments:
• Cyber Infrastructure Survey Tool (C-IST): Survey focused on over 80
cybersecurity controls in five key areas, resulting in an interactive decision
support tool
• Cyber Resilience Review (CRR): Strategic evaluation that assesses
cybersecurity management capabilities
• External Dependency Management (EDM): Assessment of the
management activities and practices utilized to identify, analyze, and
reduce risks arising from third parties
6. Incident Coordination and Support: Facilitating cyber incident response in
times of increased threat, disruption, and attack.69
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
With DHS, the U.S. DOT is the TSS Co-Sector Specific Agency having responsibility for
mass transit. Within U.S. DOT, FTA is the modal administration having primary responsibility.
After September 11, 2001, FTA developed security and emergency preparedness resources
for U.S. transit agencies. Primary among these was FTA’s The Public Transportation System
Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide70 published in January 2003. This
later evolved into the Security and Emergency Preparedness Action Items for Transit
Agencies71 that was used by the TSA to develop its voluntary security and emergency
preparedness assessment tool, Baseline Assessment and Security Enhancement (BASE).
TSA’s Surface Transportation Security Inspector (STSI) activity uses the BASE checklist to
work with transit agencies on a voluntary basis to complete a programmatic assessment of
security and emergency preparedness programs.
The FTA and TSA revised the BASE in 2012, and those changes are reflected in the 2014
Security and Emergency Preparedness Action Items for Transit Agencies.72 The main
change relevant to this study was the addition of cybersecurity as a topic.73 This change
was implemented “in consultation through TSA’s Mass Transit Sector Coordinating Council
Chaired by the American Public Transportation Association.” This addition provides
approximately a page and a half of guidance that:
• Describes the transit elements at risk
• Establishes an action item to develop a cybersecurity strategy:
○ Based on risk assessment to identify critical IT assets
○ Requires development of (and updates to) written strategies and plans,
including a cyber incident response plan
• Recommends training for all transit staff, including specific training for those
responsible for IT assets
• Monitors information from the United States Computer Emergency Readiness
Team (US-CERT)74 and Public Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (PT-ISAC)75
• Provides citations to a number of backup documents.76
On March 23, 2020, TSA published new training requirements for BASE inspectors that go
into effect June 22, 2020.77
In 2019, the FTA issued “Frequently Asked Questions: Transit Bus Automation Policy”78 to
answer questions from stakeholders about the impact that autonomous vehicle technologies
have on transit agencies. The FAQs address what transit agencies should do to develop
comprehensive cybersecurity strategies and refers back to the 2014 Security and Emergency
Preparedness document for further guidance.
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In addition to the FTA, the U.S. DOT has several other modal administrations whose work
impacts transit:
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) leads the vehicle
cybersecurity research that seeks to prevent attacks on vehicles and components.79
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) leads the research that seeks to protect the
nation’s roadside equipment, devices, and systems. In cooperation with the National
Highway Institute and other engineering organizations, FHWA developed a handbook
entitled the Federal Highway Administration Cybersecurity Handbook.80
Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office (ITS JPO), while not a modal
administration, is responsible for conducting research into cybersecurity mitigations for
transportation technologies and promoting “security by design” for existing and emerging
transportation systems.81 This focus, while important, centers on the transportation
technologies themselves, rather than the agencies’ processes and procedures for
acquiring and operating those technologies. The ITS JPO has established one of its
goals for its 2020–2025 Strategic Plan as follows:
ITS will be cyber-resilient. The vulnerabilities that ITS deployments create in the
transportation system will be continually and systematically assessed at all levels
so that risks associated with malfunction or malfeasance are mitigated to an
acceptable level and resiliency plans exist and are in use.82
In 2018, the ITS JPO issued Cybersecurity and Intelligent Transportation Systems: A Best
Practices Guide,83 which presents best practices for state and local governments to develop
their own ITS cybersecurity plan and penetration test program.

COROLLARY STATE AGENCIES
Every state has a corollary to DHS in some form. Most have technology hubs (e.g., office
of the Chief Information or Technology Officer). These too can serve as resources for public
transit agencies to support their cybersecurity efforts. The National Guard is also beginning
to take an active role. Examples of state-level National Guard commissions are:
Texas Military Department, as Texas’ National Guard is known, has one of the more
robust state-level cyber commands in the nation, with a team of 90+ cyber resources
at the ready to respond.84
MiC3, the Michigan civilian cyber corps.85 Recognizing that they will never be able to
match the salaries of the private sector, then-Governor Rick Snyder started the program
in 2013 to recruit those with the skills and capabilities needed to protect the state’s
cyber resources to be called upon when needed in the event of a cyber emergency.
In 2016, their mandate was expanded beyond emergencies to provide cyber support
for state agencies. Immunity from liability was also added for the operation, which had
100+ volunteers.
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Maryland Defense Force Cyber Security Unit supplements the cyber teams of
the Maryland National Guard.86 Created in 2010, it provides support to the Maryland
Military Department and can respond alongside it in case of a cyber emergency.
California Cybersecurity Institute is a multi-agency effort to protect California
through enhanced cybercrime forensics and statewide tactical response training.87
Cyber Collaboration Committee was established in Ohio “to determine what the
state needed to improve cybersecurity and training.”88 Part of the committee’s focus
includes the creation of a Cyber Reserve Force, whose description is similar to the
MiC3.89
It is imperative that public transit agencies understand the state-level resources available
to them.90

ANCILLARY CYBERSECURITY REGULATION OF PUBLIC TRANSIT
AGENCIES
Transit agencies are not subject to any specific legal or regulatory regime that mandates
specific standards or actions for the implementation of a cybersecurity preparedness
program.
Nonetheless, transit agencies, like most other entities, are governed by a patchwork of
legislation and regulations that do impose some cybersecurity rules. For example:
• To the extent transit agencies process payments, they are subject to cybersecurity
rules that govern the financial sector (usually imposed by contracts from the banks or
credit card companies with whom they partner).
• Similarly, in handling customer data (including payment information), transit agencies
must comply with relevant state privacy rules and various breach notification
requirements that may be triggered by a data loss.
• Transit agencies are also subject to the broad reach of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), which has the authority to levy fines and other penalties against companies
that engage in unfair or deceptive trade practices.
None of these various elements amounts to a regulatory regime that even comes close to
establishing a standard of practice that transit agencies could use as a guide in implementing
a cybersecurity preparedness program. While DHS and some of the corollary state agencies
have provided assistance to transit agencies, much of the critical guidance comes from
within the transit industry.

KEY INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS SUPPORTING TRANSIT91
As with many aspects of the U.S. economy, much of the onus for ensuring effective
management of cybersecurity risks rests within the industry itself. Here, APTA ably serves
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the needs of the public transit industry. APTA is a nonprofit, international trade association
with more than 1,500 public and private sector members. APTA provides a broad range of
services to its members that include advocacy and policy, standards, guidance and best
practices, training, research, and technical support.
There are other trade associations that represent segments of APTA’s membership, such
as the American Association of Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), the
Intelligent Transportation Society of America (ITS America), the American Bus Association
(ABA), and the International Association of Public Transport (UITP).
APTA has been providing its members with guidance on cybersecurity for the past decade.
That guidance has come primarily through its Security Standards Policy and Planning
committee and its working groups on security and emergency management standards. The
aforementioned committee is composed of representatives from a number of prominent
transit organizations and businesses and is organized into several working groups. One
working group is the Enterprise Cyber Security working group, which focuses specifically
on cybersecurity. In 2014, this group published Recommended Practice “Cybersecurity
Considerations for Public Transit,” providing a good overview of materials available to
transit operators; this Recommended Practice in particular establishes considerations
for public sector chief information officers (CIO) interested in developing cybersecurity
strategies for their organizations.92 This document also references earlier guidance that
APTA provided CIOs, including “Securing Control and Communications Systems in the
Transit Environment,” Part 1 and Part II.93
AASHTO’s purpose is to meet the needs of the state and territorial departments of
transportation (DOTs). State DOTs have multimodal responsibility, and as such, AASHTO
has a Council on Public Transit. This Council “develops legislative, policy, and program
recommendations related to all forms of passenger public transportation services.”94
The Council also supports the Multi-State Transit Technical Assistance Program (MTAP),
the primary purpose of which is to provide technical assistance to help states implement
FTA programs, to provide feedback to FTA on implementation issues, and to create a
professional network for sharing best practices.95
Information abounds for public transit agencies wanting to develop their own cybersecurity
preparedness programs; however, few prescriptions exist. Regulations and requirements
are even fewer, aside from those regulations that cross over to other industries with more
robust regulatory and compliance frameworks in place, despite public transit agencies
being labeled a critical infrastructure element for U.S. security.
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V. KEY FINDINGS
The survey findings demonstrate that many transit agencies do not fully appreciate the risks
posed by cybersecurity vulnerabilities nor the necessity to prepare for the inevitable attempts
at a breach. Transit, however, is not unique in this regard. To provide perspective, the section
draws comparison to the financial industry. Given both the level of the threat and the long
history in dealing with such threats, understanding the preparation and the resources
allocated to this matter in the financial industry can help inform resourcing decisions for
transit. Throughout the presentation of findings, the authors provide anecdotes from the
financial sector to help frame what is needed in public transit.
Funding alone is not enough to address cybersecurity risks. The root challenge for any
organization is marshalling the nonmonetary as well as monetary resources to develop
an effective cybersecurity program. This cannot be done without a mix of resources, from
executive and board-level involvement to effective hiring of cybersecurity expertise and
alignment with the overall strategy of the organization. A key lesson from other industries
is that cybersecurity preparedness does not happen in a vacuum. Systems, policies,
procedures, and other plans must be developed and iterated as new data, information, and
threats are discovered.
The survey findings present a significant cause for concern. Despite the substantial focus
that the industry has placed on cybersecurity education and preparedness over the past
decade, many transit operators remain ill prepared for the cybersecurity challenges they are
facing and are likely to face in the future. As the industry is learning with COVID-19, mitigation
tactics can only get you so far; the key question is not whether an incident will occur but
when. Far too many agencies have not implemented adequate cybersecurity measures and
are not ready to respond to a cyber incident.

FINDING: MANY AGENCIES DO NOT HAVE AN ACCURATE SENSE OF THEIR
CYBERSECURITY PREPAREDNESS
• 81% of agencies that responded believe they are prepared to manage and defend
against cybersecurity threats, and;
• 73% feel they have access to information that helps them implement their cybersecurity
preparedness program.
Yet…
• Only 60% actually have a cybersecurity preparedness program;
• 43% do not believe they have the resources necessary for cybersecurity
preparedness; and
• Only 47% audit their cybersecurity program at least once per year.
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Figure 11 shows that 81% of the organizations that responded to the online survey reported
being adequately prepared to manage and defend against cybersecurity threats. Yet Figure
12 shows that only 60% of the agencies have a cybersecurity policy in place. Given the
authors’ review of practices in other industries, it seems highly unlikely that an agency
could be prepared to defend against a cybersecurity threat without having a documented
cybersecurity policy.

1 = Not prepared at all.
5 = Very prepared.

Figure 11. How Prepared Would You Say Your Organization is in Managing and
Defending Against Cybersecurity Threats?

Figure 12. Do You Have a Documented Cybersecurity Policy? If So, How Often is it
Revised?
Despite the support activity from both industry groups and government agencies discussed
earlier in Section IV, Existing Cybersecurity Guidance for Transit, most oral interviewees
reported lacking the resources needed to effectively prepare for and respond to a cyber
incident. This finding was supported by survey data. As Figure 13 illustrates, 39 of the
respondents (43%) said they do not have the resources they need to be prepared. Only two
agencies felt strongly that they have the resources needed for cybersecurity preparedness,
and one of those is a small agency (<$10M in operating expenses).
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Oral interviewees attributed this lack of resources to a lack of prioritization by their leadership.
Several brought concerns directly to the attention of their CEO or their Board, and even then
they had limited success obtaining what they believed was necessary. One interviewee
suggested that resources for cybersecurity only became available after a major incident.
Another leveraged an outside audit (e.g., DHS CSA review, FTA’s Triennial Review,96
cybersecurity incident insurance) to highlight the potential liability to her Board and access
greater support.

1 = I do not have what I need to be prepared.
5 = I have everything I need to be prepared.

Figure 13. Do You Have the Resources (e.g., Funding, Training, Other Support) You
Need for Cybersecurity Preparedness?

Figure 14 shows that access to information does not appear to be a major challenge
for the agencies that responded; only 24 agencies (27%) reported lacking access to
information and guidance that helps them implement their cybersecurity preparedness
program. There is a material amount of useful and effective information available to assist
transit agencies implementing a cybersecurity program. This statement is affirmed by the
literature review. The challenge centers on having the resources to take advantage of the
information available, and developing a specific plan for each agency’s unique needs.
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1 = No, I do not have access to information and guidance that helps me.
5 = Yes, I have access to all information and guidance I need.

Figure 14. Do You Have Access to Information and Guidance That Helps You
Implement Your Cybersecurity Preparedness Program?

FDIC Cyber Challenge
Like transit, the financial services industry is made up of a patchwork of large and
small players. To help smaller community banks, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), one of the primary regulators of the U.S. banking system,
created the “Cyber Challenge Community Bank Cyber Exercise” program. The
agency has developed and now maintains nine different scenarios for community
banks to consider when assessing their cybersecurity preparedness.
The Cyber Challenge is designed to help financial institution management and staff
discuss events that may present operational risks and consider ways to mitigate
them. It can provide useful information about an institution’s preparedness and
identify opportunities to strengthen the bank’s resilience to operational risk.97
According to the survey, just over 60% of responding agencies audit their cybersecurity
program (see Figure 15). However, of those, only two-thirds (46% of all respondents)
perform this audit annually; the remaining agencies audit their cybersecurity preparedness
on an as-needed basis (see Figure 16). As discussed above, external audits can be effective
in drawing the attention of CEOs and Board members to deficiencies in cybersecurity
preparedness.
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Figure 15. Is There a Process (Either Internal or External to Your Organization)
That Audits Your Cybersecurity Preparedness Program or Establishes
Some Other Accountability Mechanism for That Program?

Figure 16. If Yes, How Frequent is the Audit?
The agencies surveyed claim they have not had many cybersecurity incidents. Of the 90
agencies surveyed, only 20 agencies (22%) admitted to having had a cybersecurity incident
where more than 1,000 records were breached, over $10K in losses were incurred, or an
operations system was down for more than one hour. These results seem highly suspect.
A forthcoming Transportation Research Board NCHRP Report “Security 101: A Physical
and Cybersecurity Primer for Transportation Agencies” observes that:
(T)he relatively few number of catastrophic incidents in transportation to date has
resulted in a false sense of security within the transportation sector. Recent research
estimated that on the physical security side as many as 75% of security breaches go
unreported. In terms of cyber much less is known about prospective breach percentages,
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but there is little reason to believe that the numbers are any better for cyber incidents.
What is known is that the ease of compromise of transportation cyber systems is
becoming more and more evident, and the likelihood of new or more significant events
is increasing along with the per event costs of cyber incidents and cyber-crime.98

FINDING: MOST AGENCIES DO NOT HAVE LOG MAINTENANCE
SCHEDULES WHICH SATISFY A BASIC TENET OF CYBERSECURITY
PREPAREDNESS
• 51% of agencies that responded do not retain their log data for a year or more—one
of the most basic requirements for cybersecurity preparedness
• 12% of agencies surveyed do not retain their logs at all
Many agencies fail to implement one of the most fundamental technical cybersecurity
measures: collecting, retaining, and analyzing system log data. Often, when an incident
occurs, it is identified weeks or even months after it originated. Retaining logs is a critical
source of evidence necessary to figure out when the breach occurred and what systems
were affected. Just over half of agencies that responded retain their logs for a year or
more—the minimum duration cybersecurity experts recommend retaining logs.99
Log maintenance is a complicated issue, and every organization should have a formal
log maintenance plan that speaks to each type of log being captured, how it is retained,
for how long, and how it is disposed of.100 Beyond mere retention of a log, the failure
to analyze that log data is the primary reason intrusions go undetected for months or
years after they have occurred. The evidence of the intrusion may sit languishing in
unexamined log files.101

FINDING: MOST AGENCIES DO NOT HAVE MANY OF THE BASIC POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES IN PLACE TO RESPOND IN THE EVENT OF AN INCIDENT
• 42% don’t have an incident response plan; of those that have one, over half have
not had a drill in over a year
• 36% do not have a disaster recovery plan
• 53% do not have a continuity in operations plan
• 58% do not have a business continuity plan
• 67% do not have a crisis communications plan
Transit agencies have failed to adopt basic plans that would be necessary in the event
of an incident. Agencies need to plan for incident response in parallel to taking steps to
lessen its probability. Of the 90 agencies that responded, 52 agencies have a documented
incident response plan, and of those, only 23 had a drill within the last year (see Figure
17). This suggests that, to the extent that an agency knows that an incident has occurred,
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confusion and challenges in communication, among other issues, may hinder response
effectiveness for the agency.

Figure 17. Do You Have a _____ Plan (Check All Plans That Apply)?
NIST 800-100, Information Security Handbook: A Guide for Managers, one of the basic NIST
Guidance documents, provides a “Seven-Step IT Contingency Planning Process”102 that
provides transit agencies a process that they can use to quickly identify a security incident and
take appropriate steps to recover from it. APTA, in its Recommended Practice “Cybersecurity
Considerations for Public Transit,” summarizes the suite of plans an organization should use
“to properly prepare response, recovery and continuity activities for disruptions affecting the
organization’s information systems, mission/business processes, personnel and facilities.”103
These documents include an Incident Response Plan, Business Continuity Plan, Continuity
of Operations Plan, Crisis Communications Plan, and Disaster Recovery Plan.

FINDING: MANY AGENCIES LACK THE STAFF AND THE NECESSARY
SKILLS OR TRAINING TO ADDRESS CYBERSECURITY THREATS
• Only 41% of agencies provide at least annual cybersecurity training for staff
• Cybersecurity staffing levels are low, even among large agencies or agencies that
have suffered an incident, relative to other industries
Since the internet came of age and software became a more critical aspect of any
organization’s execution, the role of the cybersecurity specialist has evolved. Once relegated
to the basement, cybersecurity experts have “grown up,” moved from the basement to the
office, and are now seated at the table with senior leadership. Many transit agencies have
not kept pace in hiring cybersecurity staff nor have they conducted the necessary training to
ensure the organization has the skills necessary to address the threat landscape. Agency
leadership needs cybersecurity expertise at the table, ready to support them with both
strategic and operational decisions in real time.
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The prioritization among transit agencies of resourcing cybersecurity needs appears limited.
Through oral interviews, several suggested that the successes they have had in developing
their cybersecurity programs have rested on their obtaining experience from other industries.
One such interviewee remarked, “We are the outlier. We have a full-scale program. [We have]
people focused directly on cybersecurity with two focused just on supply chain issues.”104
Agencies should look to bring in cybersecurity expertise from other industries, in addition to
attempting to develop talent from within.
Only 38 of the 90 survey respondents have certified cybersecurity specialists on staff, and
there is no consensus within the industry on which certification to require among potential
new hires. Agreement among transit professionals and industry experts about the value of,
and need for, specific cybersecurity certifications would be beneficial for all.
Table 2.

Certifications Held by Staff of Surveyed Agencies

Agency Count

Certification

21 (23%)

Certified Information Security Professional (CISSP), a certification provided by the
Information Security Consortium (ISC)2.105

8 (9%)

Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH), offered by the International Council of eCommerce
Consultants (EC-Council)106

6 (7%)

Certified Information Systems Auditor

Interestingly, from oral interviews, the authors learned that the transit cybersecurity
professionals that were recruited from other industries have sought each other out and maintain
regular, informal communications. While this likely assists those involved in cybersecurity
preparedness, these individuals have the least need for these informal networks.
Survey results show that headcount dedicated to cybersecurity does not correlate with either
agency size or with whether the agency reported having suffered an incident as we would
have anticipated. For those leaders interviewed who had developed a robust cybersecurity
team and program, the driving force behind their ability to build a dedicated cybersecurity
staff was that they had experienced a significant cyber incident. However, the authors did not
find corroboration for this anecdotal evidence in the digital survey data.
Figure 18 shows that of the 35 agencies with no personnel dedicated to cybersecurity, 17
are large or extra-large (>$30M in operating expenses). Among the 30 extra-large agencies
surveyed (>$100M in operating expenses), only six have five or more personnel dedicated
to cybersecurity. Three extra-large agencies have no personnel dedicated to cybersecurity.

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Key Findings

40

Figure 18. What is Your Internal Headcount Dedicated to Cybersecurity
Preparedness? (In Full Time Equivalents (FTE))
Similarly, having had a cyber incident does not necessarily drive the size of the cybersecurity
staff. Among the 20 agencies that reported having suffered an incident, four have no
personnel dedicated to cybersecurity, and only one has more than five—this despite the fact
that 17 of the 20 agencies are large or extra-large relative to operating expenses.
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How Much is Enough?
No hard data exist for how much public transit agencies should invest in cybersecurity
staff, software, and services; however, there are a few “rules of thumb” available
from the private sector. One rule used by a public transit agency cybersecurity
executive interviewed is to have one dedicated full time equivalent (FTE) focused
on cybersecurity per 500 employees.107 Among the agencies surveyed for this
study, the majority fall within this rule of thumb at 53%.
Figure 19 illustrates that financial institutions spend an average of 0.3% of revenue
and 10% of their IT budget on cybersecurity, according to numbers tallied by the
consulting firm Deloitte. “That works out to about $2,300 per employee, across
the 96 financial firms that took part in the Deloitte study, according to American
Banker.”108

Figure 19. Average Cybersecurity Spending Range109
For reference, among survey respondents, public transit agencies have an average cyber
budget of $1,490 per employee, with a min (max) of $30 ($3,600) per employee.110 From
the same survey, the average cyber budget is 2.8% of operating expenses, with a min
(max) of 0.02% (2.7%).111 The averages are in range, but the variability among agencies
is significant. The authors were not able to observe a common thread among the survey
data as to why some agencies invest in cybersecurity and others do not. One inference
from oral interviews suggests agencies that recruit cybersecurity specialists from other
industries are more effective in developing a cybersecurity program on par with the rules
of thumb described above.
NuHarbor Security, a cybersecurity services vendor, suggests that once an enterprise reaches
four internal cybersecurity-focused staff, they must hire a “people manager” to ensure the
unique needs of this team are met and their interests are represented within the organization.
Organizations with more than 5,000 employees should have a Chief Information Security
Officer on the senior leadership team to ensure the interests of information security are
appropriately represented among strategic decisions.112
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For the staff that transit agencies do hire, most do not provide cybersecurity training, provide
it only upon hire, provide it irregularly, or provide it on a voluntary basis only. Figure 20 shows
that of the 90 agencies that responded to the survey, only 37 of them (41%) provide training
at least annually.

Figure 20. Do You Have Regular Cybersecurity Training? How Often? Who is
Trained?
Of those that do not provide training with regularity, a large majority blame the lack of resources.
The authors infer that, given the ample opportunities that exist to obtain cybersecurity
training materials and modules, the limiting factor is more a function of underestimating
and de-prioritizing cyber threats rather than fiscal or other resource constraints. As noted
in the Introduction and then again in the discussion of association support, APTA has made
cybersecurity training a high priority for its membership. In addition to routinely programming
speakers and educational sessions on cybersecurity at its various meetings, APTA invested
in a high-quality training video developed for executives called “Cybersecurity Fundamentals
for Executives.”113 Since its launch at the APTA Annual Meeting in October, 2019 this training
video has been accessed more than 5,000 times.

FINDING: AGENCIES ARE ENGAGING VENDORS FOR CYBERSECURITY
SUPPORT, BUT THEY ARE NOT ALWAYS PROTECTING THEMSELVES OR
THEIR CUSTOMERS WITH APPROPRIATE CYBERSECURITY LANGUAGE
• 84% have engaged at least one vendor to provide cybersecurity software, tools,
and support
• Only 38% include standard clauses in their contracts to impose cybersecurity
requirements on all their vendors
Most agencies have taken measures to outsource some key cybersecurity functions to
vendors, as shown in Figure 21; 75 of the respondents (84%) have engaged at least one
vendor to provide cybersecurity tools, software, and support.

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Key Findings

43

Figure 21. Have You Engaged Outside Vendors to Provide Tools, Software, and
Support to Assist With Cybersecurity Preparedness?
Many leverage vendors to off-load the risk and expense of managing data covered by PCI
requirements, such as credit card data and processing. By having the vendor manage these
applications (and data), the transit agency can contractually require that the vendor maintain
state-of-the-art cyber protections. Of the 90 agencies surveyed, 76 of them (84%) use a
vendor to process and store customer payment information.
However, it appears that more work needs to be done among agencies to hold their vendors
accountable for cybersecurity readiness. Only 34 of the respondents (38%) have standard
clauses in their contracts related to cybersecurity: see Figure 22. An agency’s cyber
readiness is only as strong as its weakest link. The inability to hold vendors accountable for
their cybersecurity preparedness is a key weakness for public transit agencies.

Figure 22. Do You Have Standard Clauses in Your Vendor Contracts Related to
Cybersecurity?
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The oral and digital surveys are informative in conjunction with the literature review.
If an agency has the time and resources, there is an abundance of information on
cybersecurity risks and tools available to transit authorities. Many transit agencies are
aware of the risks posed and have taken some actions to protect themselves and some
agencies have or are in the process of putting robust cybersecurity programs in place.
Those that have the most robust programs tend to be the largest agencies with the most
risk from a public safety perspective but also the most federal resources available to
them to help address those risks.
For the majority of transit agencies, cybersecurity will remain one of many important
competing demands for limited resources. Until, and unless, the Federal government makes
cybersecurity a priority for transit agencies; provides them with the resources necessary to
establish and maintain solid cybersecurity programs; and provides them with clear guidance
on what constitutes a “solid” cybersecurity program, most agencies will continue to do the
best that they can. When resources become available, they will avail themselves. When
clear guidance becomes available, they will avail themselves of it, and as they become more
sophisticated over time they will do their best to transfer as much responsibility as possible
to third parties. When there is a cybersecurity incident they will be forced to reallocate their
limited resources to address this critical priority.
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VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
To support the findings described in the previous section, the authors propose the following
policy recommendations.

EXECUTIVE BRANCH
• DHS and U.S. DOT, the TSS Co-Sector Specific Agencies for transit, working
with input from APTA and other industry organizations, should promulgate a set
of minimum cybersecurity standards and cybersecurity assessment tools and
determine how they should best be developed, managed, and implemented.
• DHS and U.S. DOT should provide technical guidance to transit agencies on the
collection, retention, and assessment of system logs.
• FTA, working with DHS, should create an attestation program, whereby transit CEOs
are required to attest that their organization has met the minimum cybersecurity
standards established above prior to receiving federal funds.
• FTA, working with DHS and other relevant federal agencies, should require that
transit agencies either outsource management of payment data to PCI-compliant
vendors, or require that their CEO attest that they are PCI-compliant prior to receiving
federal funds.

LEGISLATURE
• Congress should increase funding to DHS and U.S. DOT to develop and promulgate
a set of minimal cybersecurity standards and tools and for their promotion.
• Congress should increase formula grant funding to transit agencies to ensure
that they have sufficient resources to meet the minimal cybersecurity standards
established above.
• Congress should ensure through its oversight powers that U.S. DOT and DHS work
together to improve cybersecurity preparedness within the TSS.

INDUSTRY/ASSOCIATION
• APTA, working with other stakeholders, should develop a clearinghouse for
cybersecurity best practices, in particular for small and medium transit operations.
• Transit Operators should develop an individualized cybersecurity plan that takes
advantage of the best practices identified above and highlighted throughout this study.
• APTA, working with other stakeholders, should create minimum guidelines for
cybersecurity audits.
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• Transit Operators should conduct a periodic cybersecurity audit and address the
shortcomings identified in that audit in a timely manner.
• APTA, working with other stakeholders, should develop model cybersecurity contract
language for agencies to integrate into their vendor contracts.
• Transit Operators should ensure all vendor contracts include standard cybersecurity
contract language. Transit Operators should conduct an audit of all external contracts
and ensure that the contracts have current, robust, cybersecurity contract language
in them protecting the Transit Operator.
• APTA, working with other stakeholders, should develop a model Incident Response
Plan, Business Continuity Plan, Continuity of Operations Plan, Crisis Communications
Plan, and Disaster Recovery Plan that can be tailored to meet the needs of public
transit organizations of varying sizes and needs.
• Transit Operators should document their security response plans respective of
industry best practices for their agency size and other variables. Transit Operators
should regularly conduct drills to ensure that they have the right plans in place and
that the organization is able to effectively react to incidents.
• APTA, working with other stakeholders, should continue to develop cybersecurity
training modules and certificates. In doing so it should take advantage of the guidance
developed by TSS, CSAs and others.
• Transit Operators should ensure that every employee receives the appropriate level
of cybersecurity training at least annually.
The cybersecurity threat to public transit operations is real. This is not a new observation,
as many before have tried to emphasize the need to address this threat. The resources
and knowledge are available; what is lacking is the focus at all levels. Mitigating this threat
and reducing its impact requires concerted, coordinated effort among policy makers,
industry representatives and public transit leadership. The recommendations above seek
to incentivize the respective stakeholders to work together to make our public transit
systems more safe, secure, and resilient.
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APPENDIX A: ORAL INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR TRANSIT
OPERATORS
NOTE: We will only use your name or organization if you give us explicit permission.
Name:
Organization:
Job title:
Email:
Phone:
Please describe your organization’s cybersecurity responsibilities:
What resources are allocated to cybersecurity in your organization?
Budget:
Internal dollars:
External dollars:
Headcount (in full-time equivalents):
Are they sufficient?
What else do you need?
What percentage of your budget is this?
Who is responsible for cybersecurity within your organization?
What is your role?
Do you have a Chief Information Security Officer? A Chief Privacy Officer? A Chief
Compliance Officer?
Has your organization suffered from an attack? What type? How often? Have you
conducted any research to determine whether your organization has suffered an attack
that you weren’t otherwise aware of?
Do you have a documented cybersecurity policy? If so, who within your organization is
familiar with its contents? When was it put into place?
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In creating your cybersecurity policy, have you applied the principles and guidance from
the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (or a different risk-management framework)?
Does your cybersecurity plan govern the entirety of your information management process
(e.g., establishment of business requirements, procurement, operations, maintenance,
disposal)?
Do you conduct cybersecurity training? If so, for whom and how often?
Do you have cybersecurity insurance? If so, what are the terms/costs?
Do you have an incident response plan (IRP)? Was that plan drafted by someone within
your organization? Have you ever rehearsed that plan?
Where do you get your cyber threat information? Is your organization a member of an
entity that shares cybersecurity information (e.g., the Public Transportation Information
Sharing and Analysis Center)?
Do you have contractual provisions associated with cybersecurity that you require?
Can we get copies of these documents? Do you have a mechanism for auditing whether
those vendors are meeting the requirements?
Do others outside your organization engage on cybersecurity in regards to your operations
(e.g., an auditor, consultant, law firm, city)? Do you have a contractual relationship with a
third-party forensic investigator who can assist in the event of a data breach?
Do you have SCADA systems in your network? How are they connected to/isolated from
your business network? Are they remotely accessible?
Do you maintain payment processing information? If so, do you adhere to the Payment
Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS)?
Are you receiving direction / requirements / process guidance from the city’s CISO or
other? Do you report out on your cybersecurity policies / practices to any person, entity
or organization?
Do you feel that your organization understands the threat that cybersecurity presents to
the transit industry?
If not, why not?
What would it take to improve your understanding?
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Do you feel that your organization is doing everything that it can to prevent a cybersecurity
attack on the transit industry?
What more could it be doing?
What do you need to do this?
What role do the various branches of the Administration play in establishing standards and
best practices for the transit industry?
What role should they play?
What would it take for them to play these roles?
Does the Administration have an adequate understanding of the risks that cybersecurity
presents to the transit industry?
Has the Administration allocated sufficient resources to the correct organizations?
If no, what should the allocation be?
Has the Administration placed sufficient priority on cybersecurity?
What role does Congress play in establishing standards and best practices for the transit
industry?
What role should it play?
Is cybersecurity a sufficient priority for Congress?
Does Congress have an adequate understanding of the risks that cybersecurity presents
to the transit industry?
What role does APTA and other industry organizations play in establishing standards and
best practices for the transit industry?
What role should they play?
Is cybersecurity a sufficient priority for these groups?
Do they have a sufficient understanding of the risk that cybersecurity presents to the
transit industry?
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APPENDIX B: ORAL INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR NON-TRANSIT
OPERATORS
NOTE: We will only use your name or organization if you give us explicit permission.
Name:
Organization:
Job title:
Email:
Phone:
Organization type:

Organization’s cybersecurity responsibilities:
What resources are allocated to cybersecurity in your organization?
Budget (not including:
Internal dollars:
External dollars:
Headcount (in full-time equivalents):
Are they sufficient?
What else do you need?
What percentage of the organization’s budget is this?
Who has lead responsibility for issues related to cybersecurity within your organization?
What is your role?
Has your organization produced documents applicable to transit cybersecurity?
If so, who within your organization is familiar with their contents?
When were they put into place? Have they been updated?
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Do you think they are sufficient? If not, why not?
Can we get copies?
Do you feel that your organization understands the threat that cybersecurity presents to
the transit industry?
If not, why not?
What would it take to improve your understanding?
Do you feel that your organization is doing everything that it can to prevent a cybersecurity
attack on the transit industry?
What more could it be doing?
What do you need to do this?
What role do the various branches of the Administration play in establishing standards and
best practices for the transit industry?
What role should they play?
What would it take for them to play these roles?
Does the Administration have an adequate understanding of the risks that cybersecurity
presents to the transit industry?
Has the Administration allocated sufficient resources to the correct organizations?
If no, what should the allocation be?
Has the Administration placed sufficient priority on cybersecurity?
What role does Congress play in establishing standards and best practices for the transit
industry?
What role should it play?
Is cybersecurity a sufficient priority for Congress?
Does Congress have an adequate understanding of the risks that cybersecurity presents
to the transit industry?
What role does APTA and other industry organizations play in establishing standards and
best practices for the transit industry?
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What role should they play?
Is cybersecurity a sufficient priority for these groups?
Do they have a sufficient understanding of the risk that cybersecurity presents to the transit
industry?
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APPENDIX C: ORAL INTERVIEW GUIDE, CAPITOL HILL
NOTE: We will only use your name or organization if you give us explicit permission.
Name:
Organization:
Job title:
Email:
Phone:
We understand that your office has been engaged in cybersecurity issues, particularly those
involving the transit industry, and we would like to ask you some questions related to your
offices’ engagement.
Why has your office become engaged in this issue? [hint: member serves on committee of
relevant jurisdiction; large scale transit operations in the district, recent cybersecurity attack
in the community or state.]
What is your role in that engagement?
Do you feel that Congress understands the threat that cybersecurity presents to the transit
industry?
If not, why not?
What would it take to improve its understanding?
Do you feel that the House/the Senate/the Committee on which your boss serves is doing
everything that it can to address cybersecurity in the transit industry?
What more could it be doing?
What do you need to do this?
Does Congress have an adequate understanding of the risks that cybersecurity presents
to the transit industry?
What role should Congress play in establishing standards and best practices for the
transit industry?
Is cybersecurity a sufficient priority for Congress?
Would you like to add anything that would aid us in better understanding your senators’/
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members’ views on cybersecurity in transit?
Now I would like to ask you a few questions about other participants in this issue:
What role do the various branches of the Administration play in establishing standards and
best practices for the transit industry?
What role should they play?
What would it take for them to play these roles?
Has the Administration allocated sufficient resources to the correct organizations?
If no, what should the allocation be?
Has the Administration placed sufficient priority on cybersecurity?
Does the Administration have an adequate understanding of the risks that cybersecurity
presents to the transit industry?
What do you see as the role for non-governmental organizations such as trade associations
in this issue?
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APPENDIX D: MTI DIGITAL SURVEY AND DIGITAL SURVEY
RESPONSES
The Mineta Transportation Institute at San José State University has commissioned a study
to investigate the extent to which the transit industry is ready for the cyber revolution and to
make policy recommendations to enhance surface transit cyber preparedness.
Data from the following survey will be used in aggregate to provide an understanding for
both industry and policy leaders as to the current state of cybersecurity preparedness in
surface transit. Any information or views that you provide will be treated confidentially with no
attribution to you or your employer without your express approval.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AASHTO

American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials

ABA

American Bus Association

AG

Attorney General

AI

Artificial Intelligence

API

Application Program Interface

APTA

American Public Transit Association

BASE

Baseline Assessment and Security Enhancement

BART

Bay Area Transit Authority

BEC

Business Email Compromise

BRT

Bus Rapid Transit

CDOT

Colorado Department of Transportation

CIO

Chief Information Officer

C-IST

Cyber Infrastructure Survey Tool

CISA

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency

CRR

Cyber Resilience Review

CSA

Cybersecurity Advisors

DOD

United States Department of Defense

DOT

United States Department of Transportation

DSS

Decision Support System

DHS

United States Department of Homeland Security

DSRC

Dedicated Short-Range Communication

EDM

External Dependency Management

EO

Executive Order

EDA

External Demand Management Assessment

FAQs

Frequently Asked Questions

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FDIC

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

FFIEC

Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council

FHWA

Federal Highway Administration

FTA

Federal Transit Administration

FTC

Federal Trade Commission

FTE

Full Time Equivalent
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
GPS

Global Positioning Systems

ICT

Information and Communication Technology

ITS America

Intelligent Transportation Society of America

ITS JPO

Intelligent Transportation System Joint Program Office

MaaS

Mobility as a Service

MiC3

Michigan Civilian Cyber Corps

MOD

Mobility on Demand

MTAP

Multi-State Transit Technology Assistance Program

NHTSA

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

NIST

National Institute of Standards and Technology

NTD

National Transit Database

OSTP

White House Office of Science and Technology Policy

PCI

Payment Card Industry

PCI DSS

Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard

PII

Personally Identifiable Information

PPD

Presidential Policy Directive

PT-ISAC

Public Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center

SCADA

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

SSA

Sector Specific Agencies

STSI

Surface Transportation Security Inspector

SVBX

Silicon Valley Berryessa Extension

TNC

Transportation Network Company

TSA

Transportation Security Agency

TSS

Transportation Systems Sector

UITP

International Association of Public Transport

US-CERT

United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team

USDOT

United States Department of Transportation

WMATA

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
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